4 October 2013

Yes, this is Keccak!

SUMMARY: NIST's current proposal for SHA-3 is a subset of the Keccak family, and one can generate test vectors for that proposal using our reference code submitted to the contest.

In the end, it will be NIST's decision on what exactly will be standardized for SHA-3, but we would like, as the Keccak team, to take the opportunity to remind some facts about Keccak and give some opinion on the future SHA-3 standard.

First some reminders on Keccak

  • Keccak is a family of sponge function instances, encompassing capacity values ranging from 0 to 1599 bits. All these instances are well-defined and so are their security claim. Our SHA-3 submission highlighted instances with capacities c=448, 512, 768 and 1024 for strictly meeting NIST's SHA-3 requirements on the SHA-2 drop-in replacement instances, plus a capacity of 576 for a variable-output-length instance. Nevertheless, the capacity is an explicitly tunable parameter, in the line of what NIST suggested in their SHA-3 call, and we therefore proposed in our SHA-3 submission document that the capacity would be user-selectable.
  • The capacity is a parameter of the sponge construction (and of Keccak) that determines a particular security strength level, in the line of the levels defined in [NIST SP 800-57]. Namely, for a capacity c, the security strength level is c/2 bits and the sponge function is claimed to resist against all attacks up to 2c/2, unless easier with a random oracle. As we make a clear security claim for each possible value of the capacity, a user knows what the expect and a cryptanalyst knows her target. Conversely, we provide a tool that helps determine the minimum capacity and output length given collision and pre-image resistance requirements.
  • The core of Keccak, namely the Keccak-f permutations, has not changed since round 2 of the SHA-3 competition. When Keccak was selected for the 2nd round, we increased the number of rounds to have a better safety margin (from 18 to 24 rounds for Keccak-f[1600]). The round function has not changed since the original submission in 2008.
  • Keccak is the result of using the sponge construction on top of the Keccak-f permutations and applying the multi-rate padding to the input. Using multi-rate padding causes each member of the Keccak family (and in particular for each value of the capacity) to act as an independent function.
  • As a native feature, Keccak provides variable output length, that is, the user can dynamically ask for as many output bits as desired (e.g., as a mask generating function such as MGF1).

Keccak in the SHA-3 standard

NIST's current proposal for SHA-3, namely the one presented by John Kelsey at CHES 2013 in August, is a subset of the Keccak family. More concretely, one can generate the test vectors for that proposal using the Keccak reference code (version 3.0 and later, January 2011). This alone shows that the proposal cannot contain internal changes to the algorithm.

We did not suggest NIST to make any change to the Keccak components, namely the Keccak-f permutations, the sponge construction and the multi-rate padding, and we are not aware of any plans that NIST would do so. However, the future standard will not include the entire Keccak family but will select only specific instances of Keccak (i.e., with specific capacities), similarly to the block and key lengths of AES being a subset of those of Rijndael. Moreover, it will append some parameter-dependent suffix to the input prior to processing (see below) and fix the output length (for the SHA-2 drop-in replacements) or keep it variable (for the SHAKEs).

Here are further comments on these choices.

First, about suffixes (sometimes referred to as padding).

In Sakura, we propose to append some suffix to the input message, before applying Keccak. This is sometimes presented as a change in Keccak's padding rule because adding such a suffix can be implemented together with the padding, but technically this is still on top of the original multi-rate padding.

The suffixes serve two purposes. The first is domain separation between the different SHA-3 instances, to make them behave as independent functions (even if they share the same capacity). The second is to accomodate tree hashing in the future in such a way that domain separation is preserved.

The security is not reduced by adding these suffixes, as this is only restricting the input space compared to the original Keccak. If there is no security problem on Keccak(M), there is no security problem on Keccak(M|suffix), as the latter is included in the former.

Second, about the output length.

Variable output length hashing is an interesting feature for natively supporting a wide range of applications including full domain hashing, keystream generation and any protocol making use of a mask generating function. In its current proposal, NIST plans on standardizing two instances: SHAKE256 and SHAKE512, with capacity c=256 and c=512 and therefore security strength levels of 128 and 256 bits, respectively.

The traditional fixed output-length instances acting as SHA-2 drop-in replacement (SHA3-xxx) are obtained from truncating Keccak instances at the given output length.

Third, about the proposed instances and their capacities.

The capacity of the SHAKEs is given above and we now focus on the SHA-2 drop-in replacement instances with fixed output length n, with n in {224, 256, 384, 512}.

The SHA-3 requirements asked for a spectrum of resistance levels depending on the attack: n/2 for collision, n for first pre-image and n-k for second pre-image (with 2k the length of the first message). To meet the requirements and avoid being disqualified, we set c=2n so as to match the n-bit pre-image resistance level, and the requirements on other attacks followed automatically as they were lower. However, setting c=2n is also a waste of resources. For instance, Keccak[c=2n] before truncation provides n-bit collision resistance (in fact n-bit resistance against everything), but after truncation to n bits of output it drops to n/2-bit collision resistance.

Instead, adjusting the capacity to meet the security strength levels of [NIST SP 800-57] gives better security-performance trade-offs. In this approach, one aims at building a protocol or a system with one consistent security target, i.e., where components are chosen with matching security strength levels. The security strength level is defined by the resistance to the strongest possible attack, i.e., (internal) collisions so that, e.g., SHA-256 is at 128 bits for digital signatures and hash-only applications. Hence, setting c=n simply puts SHA3-n at the n/2-bit security level.

Among the Keccak family, NIST decided to propose instances with capacities of c=256 for n=224 or 256, and c=512 bits for n=384 or 512. This proposal is the result of discussions between the NIST hash team and us, when we visited them in February and afterwards via mail. It was then publically presented by John Kelsey at CT-RSA later in February and posted on the NIST hash-forum mailing list soon after. It was then presented at several occasions, including Eurocrypt 2013, CHES 2013 at UCSB, etc.

The corresponding two security strength levels are 128 bits, which is rock-solid, and an extremely high 256 bits (e.g., corresponding to RSA keys of 15360 bits [NIST SP 800-57]).

Comments on some of the criticism

Finally, we now comment on some criticism we saw in the discussions on the NIST hash-forum mailing list.

  • “128 bits of security are not enough in particular in the light of multi-target pre-image attacks.” We addressed this specifically in a message to the NIST SHA-3 mailing list, we explained why this fear is unfounded and why the 128 bits of security do not degrade for multi-target pre-image attacks. And anyway the SHA-3 proposal includes functions with 256-bit security, which the user is free to choose as well.
  • “SHA3-256 does not provide 256-bit pre-image resistance.” With c=256, this is correct indeed. We proposed to reduce the capacity of SHA3-256 to 256 bits to follow our security-strength oriented approach, which better addresses actual user requirements than the traditional way of inferring resistance of hash functions from the output length. Nevertheless, to avoid confusion for people expecting 256-bit resistance from SHA3-256, we made a 2nd proposal that sets c=512 for all SHA-2 drop-in replacement instances, hence providing the traditional 256-bit pre-image resistance.
  • “There is no instance providing 512-bit pre-image resistance.” Again, this is correct. The answer is similar to the previous point, except that our new proposal does not extend to capacities higher than c=512 bits, simply because claiming or relying on security strength levels above 256 bits is meaningless. Setting c=1024 would induce a significant performance loss, and there are no standard public-key parameters matching 512 bits of security. Also we believe that this security level was more a side-effect and not a security target in itself. All conventional hash functions that would aim at 256-bit collision resistance would automatically provide 512-bit preimage resistance. Keccak however is a different cryptographic object and SHA3-512 can safely provide a security strength of 256 bits against all attacks without the need to boost the security level beyond any meaning.
  • “Claiming a higher security level provides a safety margin.” In the Keccak design philosophy, safety margin comes from the number of rounds in Keccak-f, whereas the security level comes from the selected capacity. We have designed Keccak so as to have a strong safety margin for all possible capacities. At this moment, this safety margin is very comfortable (4 to 5 rounds out of 24 are broken). Of course, the user can still increase the capacity to get a security level that is higher than the one he targets, and hence somehow artificially increase the safety margin. But, there is simply no need to do so. We also refer to Martin Schläffer's excellent summary, posted on the NIST hash-forum mailing list on October 1st, 2013 at 10:16 GMT+2 (thanks Martin!).

As explained in our new proposal, we think the SHA-3 standard should emphasize the SHAKE functions. The SHA-3 user would keep the choice between lean SHAKE256 with its rock-solid security strength level and the heavier SHAKE512 with its extremely high security strength level. In implementations, the bulk of the code or circuit is dedicated to the Keccak-f[1600] permutation and from our experience supporting multiple rates can be done at very small cost.

References

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